



A WALL OF INTEGRITY
On April 5, 1989, the Assembly
Select Committee on Ethics held hear-
ings in Sacramento. Although some cyn-
ics consider its title to be an oxymoron,
the Committee appeared to be meeting
in good faith to consider several propos-
als to preclude conflicts of interest by
legislators in carrying out their responsi-
bilities. The legislature's record in ethi-
cal matters to that point had been mori-
bund. It had refused to limit campaign
contributions by individuals or PACs;
refused to provide for public financing
of campaigns-the only real option to
ameliorate the current endemic corrup-
tion; refused to cut off the outside
income of attorney legislators who con-
tinue lucrative legal practices on the side
(often involving those with business
before the legislature); refused to seri-
ously consider measures to create a spe-
cial prosecutor position to handle politi-
cal crimes; and refused to limit the
revolving legislator-turned-lobbyist
door.
The legislature had the major ethical
reform applicable to state government
jammed down its throat by the people
through the Political Reform Act of
1974. But for the electorate, there would
not even be meaningful reporting of
campaign contributors or a Fair Political
Practices Commission. Most members
of the legislature did not support this
reform measure. They have not inter-
fered with its provisions as applied to
local officials or the executive branch,
but have eviscerated its most important
feature as applied to them. That is,
where a California public official has a
personal conflict of interest, he or she
may not officially act. California law
prohibits official acts where there are
such conflicts and provides for criminal,
civil injunctive, and civil penalties
where the official improperly votes or
acts. The 1974 Act passed by the elec-
torate originally subjected legislators to
FPPC enforcement and civil injunctive
sanctions should they proceed to vote or
otherwise act on a matter where they
have a conflict of interest. But in 1980,
the legislature amended the Act to
remove any remedy for their own con-
flicts of interest (except for reprimands
by its own ethics committee, which has
never acted dispositively).
Then, in 1988, the United States
Attorney began his indictments of
California legislators for bribery, extor-
tion, et al.; two have so far been convict-
ed. Meanwhile, campaign contribution
abuse reached a zenith of abusive influ-
ence. In 1987, legislative incumbents
solicited and received $25 million- and
1987 was not even an election year. A
slightly larger amount was collected in
1989, the next non-election year. Togeth-
er with even larger election year
fundraising, incumbents outraised their
nearest challengers by thirty-to-one,
with almost 90% of all contributions
flowing from Sacramento PACs.
Then there were the honoraria. These
cash payments were given to legislators
for "speeches," which often consisted of
nothing more than breakfast meetings
with PAC pooh-bahs. Several legislators
had been embarrassed by the revelation
of $5,000 fees for breakfast conversa-
tion, followed by friendly legislative
acts. Meanwhile, the legislature's dismal
record in areas such as children's health,
care of the elderly, crime, and transporta-
tion has been the vector result of policies
favored by those well-funded in Sacra-
mento. Those of us who attempt advoca-
cy there are disgusted by the cynicism of
legislators who simply will not vote
against an organized special interest, and
who repeatedly ask those advocating
important reforms to go out in the hall-
way and satisfy the outrageous demands
of monied interests before proceeding
further. Perhaps the most flagrant exam-
ple of such corruption is the major role
of California's legislature in the savings
and loan scandal of the past ten
years-interplaying intimately with
campaign contributions from those
receiving a total deregulatory blank
check to spend the federal taxpayer's
precious assets.,
Surveys showed that the state's politi-
cians were held in low repute. And two
term limitation measures were heading
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toward the 1990 ballot, both polling
overwhelming support. This was the set-
ting for the April 5, 1989 hearing before
the Assembly Ethics Committee. We tes-
tified, along with others, in order to try
to impress upon sitting legislators the
need for decisive action. It has long been
our thesis that the most pernicious cor-
ruption threatening our society is the
control of the state by those with a vest-
ed profit stake in its decisions. Those
acting on behalf of the state must be
independent, must decide issues on the
merits and in the long-range interests of
the citizenry they represent. Almost
sounds like a naive cliche today, doesn't
it? Recite basic American tenets about
checks and balances and integrity, and
the reaction is not boredom, but patron-
izing bemusement.
We delivered the following testimony
to the Committee, and we reproduce it in
full because of its relevance to subse-
quent events.
"Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee: My name is Professor
Robert C. Fellmeth, Director of the Cen-
ter for Public Interest Law.
As legislators, your job is important. I
contend it is the most important position
in our society-without peer. You have
expansive powers, and may affirmative-
ly act, or not act, to alter almost any
aspect of our lives. You make laws and
determine sanctions for their violation.
You have the power to specify death.
You compel payment of taxes and spend;
in 1988-89, you will collect and spend
$79 billion dollars. You create regulatory
agencies to license, monitor, and disci-
pline. You have created more than sixty
of them operating under enabling
statutes and your oversight covering pol-
lution, worker safety, pesticides, coastal
development, and the regulation of utili-
ties, insurance, banking, real estate sales,
alcohol sales, and 45 different trades and
professions-from the physician who
delivers us to the mortician who
embalms us. You decide the rules of the
marketplace, the obligations we owe to
each other, and who pays in damages
when those obligations are breached.
You largely determine the quality of our
lives, with the executive left to carry out
your programs and the judiciary to inter-
pret your intent.
To you we entrust much and we
expect much. There are two things we
expect above all else: that you protect
democracy by making sure elections are
competitive and fair, and that your pub-
lic decisions are made on the merits.
After fair elections, you must build a
wall of integrity. Because the importance
of our legislators is unparalleled, the
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public owes you consummate respect.
You owe the public total fidelity. Your
salary should be set by an independent
commission. The standard should be a
level of pay comparable to those of pub-
lic servants with similar station and
responsibility. The independent commis-
sion should be given authority to make
this decision. It should be subject to
alteration only by affirmative act of two-
thirds of the legislature. This decision is
no less self-interested than is the draw-
ing of lines for districts and should like-
wise be so treated.
Ideally, that pay should be adequate
and more than is currently extant. But
that should be all a legislator receives.
Period. No exceptions. No honoraria.
None. No travel paid by private sources.
None. No gifts outside of immediate
family. None. No law practice. None. No
personal use of campaign funds. None.
All investments in blind trusts. All.
Such an absolute system works small
hardships. Perhaps a legislator wants to
write a book. Perhaps a group wants to
pay his or her way for an educational
trip. Perhaps investments are in areas
unrelated to the votes of a member. Per-
haps. But the bright-line test is warrant-
ed. It is clear. It is unmistakable. It is the
wall of integrity which tells the world:
the work of these people is so special
and so important that we will brook no
exceptions. They are now "ours."
Nobody pays them but the People for
whom they work. And it is an exclusive
contract.
No employment for two years after
leaving the legislature which involves
legislative or regulatory (executive) con-
tact for pay. And the same rules go for
all legislative staff, for upper executive
staff, for members of regulatory agency
boards, and high officials.
Enforcement of these standards and
other existing laws protecting the basic
integrity of our democratic institutions
requires a special prosecutor. Such a
mechanism must provide for the kind of
independence which takes elected prose-
cutors "off the hook" and which operates
by automatic trigger. The early draft of
such legislation by Senator Keene2 lacks
such a mechanism and is basically a
restatement of the current powers of the
Attorney General to prosecute a case or
assign it out. The bill draft of Assembly-
member Killea3 is modeled after the cur-
rent federal Independent Counsel Act
and is preferable. It does no good to cre-
ate an independent system and then wink
at noncompliance or defer to an agency
which has its own burdens in prosecut-
ing such cases.
The remedies themselves should not
he the draconian choice of no sanction or
criminal prosecution. A system of civil
penalties and injunctive relief should be
created to provide a spectrum of
response appropriate to the degree and
intent of the violation.
I know this hearing focuses on pro-
posals regarding income, honoraria,
travel, and gifts, but these issues must be
viewed in the context of our elections. In
1988, three incumbents were defeated.
In 1986, no incumbent was defeated.
Approximately 90 incumbents were run-
ning in each election. The turnover from
death and retirement far exceeds
turnover from electoral defeat. But it is
not just the lack of turnover that is the
problem. It is the margin. The average
incumbent wins by almost three to one
over the nearest challenger.
Political scientists ascribe to incum-
bency a natural 10% advantage. What
we have is an incumbency advantage on
a far different scale. We have gerryman-
dered districts without shame. And we
have allowed the special interests to take
over the financing of our campaigns.
Incumbents raise, on average, thirty
times the funds as their nearest chal-
lenger. Almost all of it comes from the
Sacramento PACs. And much of it is col-
lected by incumbents during non-elec-
tion years when the givers and takers are
focused on legislation, not elections.
And amounts spent are increasing each
election.
Proposition 73, enacted in 1988, is
unlikely to change much. Its campaign
contribution limits are set by fiscal year,
allowing a couple to give $10,000 to
each and every senatorial candidate. A
single corporation's ten-member board
of directors and their spouses could fun-
nel $100,000 to every single candidate
running. Political action committees can
give more. And those committees are so
liberally defined that the limitations
imposed are ephemeral. There are no
aggregate contribution limits. There are
no spending limits of any kind. The
security of what is statistically a lifetime
job should provide the freedom to ignore
all but the merits of bills. But that is not
what is happening. Whatever the reality,
many legislators seem to run from shad-
ows, to build war chests for a preemptive
strike.
There are now 780 registered lobby-
ists in Sacramento. That is six for each
legislator. Ninety-five percent of them
represent interests with a direct profit
stake in public policy. Although their
intensity of interest deserves to be con-
sidered in setting public policy, it should
not determine that policy. The ultimate
corruption of the body politic is to have
the state reflect in vector-like fashion the
preferences of those organized around an
immediate profit stake in public policies.
Left out of this equation are critical
interests, however you may personally
care about them, including the environ-
ment, the taxpayer, children, the con-
sumer, the dispossessed, the future.
The answer is a wall of integrity
around yourselves in your campaigns as
well as afterwards. We contend that o
build that wall and keep it secure is your
most important task.
Campaign contributions must be
meaningfully limited so disproportionate
influence based on money contributed is
precluded. There must be aggregate lim-
its. There must be a ban on off-year
fundraising. The loopholes of Proposi-
tion 73 must be filled. Ideally, Assembly
terms should be four years rather than
two, removing the burden of constant
campaigning and making the elections
more meaningful.
Most important, there must be public
funding of campaigns. It is illogical to
argue that taxpayer money should not be
spent on campaigns. The $79 billion
now being spent translates into over one-
half billion dollars for each legislator.
The financing of the total election from
the general fund, even at high campaign
spending levels, would cost much less
than one-tenth of one percent of the
amount the legislature spends. It is pru-
dent to spend one-tenth of one percent to
stimulate the sensible spending of the
remaining 99.9% in the public interest.
If for some reason one opposes public
funding, what about the Proposition 68
formula of voluntary tax check-offs?
What about a 95% tax credit for contri-
butions made to political campaigns?
The point is that under the Buckley
case,4 no spending limits are possible
without the quid pro quo of a fund from
which a candidate benefits in order to
agree to limitations. Without spending
limits and a level playing field, our sys-
tem is in jeopardy. Without this reform,
we do not have an effective democracy.
The basic structure of three-to-one or
five-to-one matching contributions, with
small contributions from the district
yielding the five-to-one match, and with
a threshold support of private contribu-
tions required, is embodied in Proposi-
tion 68, which won voter approval and
which is properly the law. It is now
before you also in AB 1844.5
There is strong movement for initia-
tives on redistricting, campaign reform,
and the compensation questions before
you today. That is not the most desirable
way of legislating anything. You are
locked in. You cannot refine a measure
or correct an error. The approach we
suggest is to opt for bright-line tests,
clear prohibitions, and to delegate to
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others decisions you should acknowl-
edge are not best made by you.
The need for you to act does not arise
from any dramatic single event, indict-
ments notwithstanding. The real harm is
a continuous leak, a bending, a gradual
diminution in public confidence in you.
The restoration of meaningful elec-
tions and decisionmaking on the merits
requires measures which are now sadly
out-of-fashion: legislators will have to
act against their narrow self-interest.
They must endure the prospect of some-
what more competitive elections made
possible by their own hand. They would
have to reject any source of influence
which compromises the fiduciary trust
of their constituencies.
Some think these reforms are unreal-
istic in the world of politics, where sta-
tus may depend upon being "sophisticat-
ed," being a "player," "looking out for
number one." One is expected to try to
"exert influence" to "increase power and
prerogatives," to gain more "appoint-
ments," to control more "appropria-
tions," to "get more ink," to enhance
"territory," to get "perks."
Some of us believe you are better
than that. That you know basic princi-
ples of fair elections and excessive spe-
cial interest influence are at stake. And
that you are indeed willing to act against
your individual self-interest for a larger
purpose."
The reaction to this testimony was
both revealing and discouraging. An
argument was immediately made that
legislators "should be allowed to accept
wedding presents if they get married."
Several examples of allegedly legitimate
presents were cited. And one legislator,
considered public-spirited and conscien-
tious, remarked: "You know, you act as
if you have been talking to Jerry Brown
[who had recently visited Mother Tere-
sa]." The remark was made in a patron-
izing and dismissive manner with smirks
of agreement all around. You see, gentle
reader, this is the problem. They didn't
get it. They didn't get it then, and you
know something? They don't get it now.
They haven't a clue.
They have joined the legislator tribe
and are vying for advantage and perks
with all the alacrity, and common sense,
of a middle eastern monarch. What is
ironic is that many of them will sacrifice
individually. They will serve as legisla-
tors at well below market rates of com-
pensation for their alternative services.
Many work long hours. Many are honor-
able men and women doing what they
see as work in the highest tradition of
public spirit. But when it comes to sacri-
ficing the power or authority of their
institution, of subjecting each other to
greater electoral competition, of cleans-
ing the legislature en masse of corruptive
influence-not a chance. The individual
sacrifice is personal nobility. The institu-
tional reform is betrayal of the tribe, and
an admission that they are not sophisti-
cated players but naive idealists (and
hence implicitly weak). One wonders if
this tribe realizes how pathetic they
appear to those outside its confines.
Well, after that hearing, they did a
few things. They enacted implementing
legislation to Proposition 112, which
limited their embarrassing honoraria,
required a one-year waiting period prior
to the revolving-door acceptance of lob-
byist employment, and actually subject-
ed their conflicts of interest to at least the
potential jurisdiction of the FPPC. But
don't get too excited. They did not really
limit outside income in general; the
revolving door still swings rather easily;
and the legislature hardly fears the
FPPC-whose appropriations it con-
trols. This is no wall of integrity.
The failure of the legislature to act
has produced an ethical catastrophe in
Sacramento. Three things have com-
bined to produce that result: the first is
the little-discussed economic- political
background; the second and third are
very recent developments. The conflu-
ence of all three spells disaster for honest
state government. Reviewing them in
order:
1. The growth of horizontal associ-
ations and the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine. We are now organized horizontal-
ly as a society. We used to relate to
our clients, our customers, our stu-
dents-vertically. We were a nation of
entrepreneurs and independent trades-
persons and farmers. We have moved
into a nation of corporate or institutional
employees. And we relate to our occupa-
tional peers horizontally. So we have
created the modern political vehicle of
power-the trade association. There are
now almost 1,000 of them in Sacramen-
to. And over 1,000 professional full-time
lobbyists represent their interests, sub-
stantially more than were active when
the testimony quoted above was deliv-
ered.
The people who employ lobbyists
reported spending more than $193 mil-
lion in the latest two-year period (1989-
1990) to influence legislation, a 22%
increase over the previous two-year
reporting period. The biggest spender
was the Western States Petroleum Asso-
ciation representing 50 oil industry com-
panies. Second highest was the Califor-
nia Manufacturers Association. Third
was the Association of California Insur-
ance Companies. Fourth was the Califor-
nia Medical Association. The leading
political powers in the state are the oil,
insurance, medical, trial lawyer, alcohol,
tobacco, and manufacturing industries,
and the California Teachers Association.
These are the same people delivering the
campaign contributions. They have
access to our legislature and our Gover-
nor.
Gentle reader, as an entity advocating
policy in Sacramento for twelve years,
let us tell you: these are not nice people.
They are cynical operators, former staff
and legislators, unabashedly out for
number one-and using a bastardized
version of the "adversary process, every-
one has a right to representation" precept
as their shallow ethical cover. These
entities have veto power over our legis-
lature. Any one of them can stop almost
any reform measure. And there are twen-
ty others like them. Left out of this mix
are those representing the environment,
children, long-range health and safety,
any group which is unorganized or dis-
possessed. Left out as well is any obliga-
tion we have to our legatees who suc-
ceed us in the millennia to come.
All of this is frightening enough. But
we have to add to this unfortunate ethical
malaise a structural coup de gras. There
is a doctrine in antitrust law which is
very important to all of us. Under this
doctrine, fixing prices collusively is a
felony offense. With the rise of the hori-
zontal associations as political powers,
one can see the import of such a law. A
charge agreed upon by most or all of the
grocers or car dealers acts as a privately
imposed tax on the consumers of those
products. Hence, if any firm agrees on
prices through an association, or even
with other members of the association
(even so few members that very little
business is affected), it is a felony
offense that even big business worship-
pers concede is properly prosecuted.
And the law makes unlawful not just
price fixing itself, but any collusion
which affects price-for example, an
agreement to allocate business, or to
restrict supply.
But companion U.S. Supreme Court
cases fashioned an exception to the col-
lusion prohibition, termed the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.6 Where money is
assessed by a combination of competi-
tors through such an association and is
spent for political purposes, i.e., to peti-
tion government, collusion is allowed.
The full consequences of this policy
judgment have not been thought through
by the courts or by many policy ana-
lysts-but we submit it is a most serious
impediment to the basic values of Amer-
ican government: the preservation of an
incorruptible and independent state. For
it has been interpreted by trade associa-
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tions to allow the assessment of unlimit-
ed fees for political influence, including
campaign contributions and lobbying.
Hence, when the Association of Cali-
fornia Insurance Companies met in 1987
to finance its campai ns for and against
various insurance initiatives on the 1988
ballot, it simply assessed the member-
ship 1% of the premiums collected by
each. An economist will tell you that it
just agreed to fix prices 1% higher. The
association acted only as the state may
act in agreeing to an industry-wide
assessment-which is a direct tax-like
pass-through to the consumers of that
industry. The insurance companies
raised $60 million, more than the Repub-
lican or Democratic parties spent nation-
ally on their 1988 presidential cam-
paigns. And they did it easily. They lost
some of their campaigns and won sever-
al, but they pushed the poll results sig-
nificantly in their direction because of
the monied advantage they had. And the
counterforce provided by Nader and his
credibility, and the media attention and
citizen interest in the issue, is a regret-
tably atypical phenomenon. Ironically,
even after the victory of Proposition
103, the unlimited resources available to
this industry to litigate and delay the
implementation of a statute which it
opposes is itself testimony to the power
of group assessment of fees across an
industry.
The point which has not been fully
absorbed or discussed by commentators
is that this industry could just as well
have raised $100 million. Or $200 mil-
lion. And that other industries so hori-
zontally organized have few financial
limitations on these resources. They sim-
ply assess what they think it will take.
We pay it.
Where is the check here? Where is
the balance? Where is the pluralism? Is
it to be merely the struggle between such
horizontal groupings?
The major checks federally have been
prohibitions on corporate contributions,
and contribution limitations. California
has had contribution limitations. They
were not nearly as significant as Propo-
sition 68's proposed $25,000 aggregate
contribution limitation on all political
contributions by a single PAC-the most
badly needed reform currently absent.
But it has been at least a $1,000 limita-
tion per person and $2,500 per commit-
tee in contributions to each candidate for
legislative and other statewide offices.
At least there was some limitation. Or so
we thought. Which brings us to point
number two.
2. The removal of all campaign
contribution limitations by 1990 court
decisions. Two separate propositions
were enacted in 1988, both of which pro-
vided for state campaign contribution
limitations: Propositions 68 and 73.
7
Proposition 73 was no beauty. Written
by state senators Montoya (since con-
victed of extortion and bribery), John-
son, and Kopp, this version limited con-
tributors to $1,000 or $2,500 per fiscal
year. Since a state senator has a four-
year term, five fiscal years fall between
terms. He or she would then collect the
maximum from PAC friends each year.
The actual limit would be $5,000 from
individuals and $12,500 from commit-
tees. His or her challenger, appearing
during the election year, would have
one-fifth the incumbent's effective limit.
U.S. District Court Judge Karlton saw
through this self-serving system and
quite properly declared it to be a device
ensuring incumbency advantage and
violative of basic first amendment/equal
protection standards.8
The court pointedly mentioned that
the method of limitation of Proposition
68 (which was enacted in the very same
election) did pass muster. That initiative
imposed a similar contribution limit by
election, not by fiscal year. It also
included a series of important reforms
establishing spending limitations, a vol-
untary tax form check-off to fund a five-
to-one match for any small local contri-
bution to a qualifying candidate, and
number of meaningful conflict of inter-
est and other standards.
However, the California Supreme
Court, in a baffling decision only five
weeks later, declared that since Proposi-
tions 68 (pertaining only to the state leg-
islative elections) and 73 (pertaining to
all elections but confined to only three
major provisions) both passed but occu-
pied the same general subject matter, it
would strike the whole of the proposition
which passed with the fewer votes
(Proposition 68).9 In othe'r words, the
court, in its finite wisdom, found a
proposition which had been almost
entirely thrown out as unconstitutional to
be in conflict with and therefore totally
cancel another enactment which passed
and which has very few comparable pro-
visions. In oral argument, the court made
clear that it felt it is just too complicated
a task to take two measures and to figure
out provision by provision which con-
flicts with which and what is left. Actu-
ally, this was a rather easy task in this
case-but the issue is: that is the job of
the court--that is why we have a court
system, to do just this task in just this sit-
uation. They punted. And they punted
backwards.
The end result of these two decisions
is remarkable. There are now no con-
tribution limitations whatever on the
amounts PACs may contribute to state
political candidates. We have not heard
about this fact from the media. It has not
been reported. We have mentioned this
to some of our leading journalists and
their reactions are interesting: "Really?
That can't be right, can it? Are you
sure?" Followed by befuddlement, con-
fusion, and dismissal as they scramble
for the next story about a major scandal.
They have trouble absorbing the obvi-
ous: this is the major scandal. Noerr-
Pennington combined with this fact is
the Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Con-
tra, and savings and loan scandals all
wrapped up together and squared.. and
then squared again. Too big. They didn't
get it.
3. The passage of a term limitation
provision, requiring huge campaign
treasuries to remain in political office.
Well, now we come to the piece de resis-
tance. The voters got mad. They got
even. In 1990, they rejected the sensible
and balanced reform, Proposition 131,
and went with the demagogic Proposi-
tion 140. Proposition 140's term limita-
tions are too short. After six years, you
are expelled from the Assembly; sena-
tors are restricted to eight years. And the
initiative cut legislative staffs by 40%.
Those of us who advocate policy in
Sacramento can tell you that our dire
predictions about these two elements are
now coming to pass. The legislature did
not cut their district office staffs-these
people help them get elected. They cut
their policy staffs the most. They now
either refuse to carry complex or impor-
tant legislation, or they openly rely on
the staffs of the PACs to do all of the
drafting and negotiating, i.e., legislating.
Both of these regrettable results are now
occurring.
In addition, legislators now have to
make some interesting decisions. They
might have to get out of politics, in
which case many will take jobs with the
PACs; thus, they will spend the six or
eight years they have left easing the way
with their future employers. Or they will
stay in political office. If that is their
choice, they will have to accumulate a
huge political campaign war chest. For
they will have to challenge an incumbent
in the other house after six or eight
years. Those who are newly elected will
have to face such challenges and will
have to respond with massive campaign
treasuries in kind. Campaign contribu-
tion needs and the good graces of the
PACs now assume premium value.
Friends, we have trouble in River
City.
The confluence of the three factors
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we have outlined above is not threaten-
ing the sky with collapse. It has fallen. It
is around our ankles right now. One
interesting question is: where is the
media? Why is none of this being dis-
cussed? Well, this issue has nothing to
do with a celebrity. It is not a petty irony.
It involves no individualized human dra-
ma of life and death. There is no Barbara
Walters to feign concern and solicit
tears. There is only institutional col-
lapse, incentives for corruption in the
here and now, day after day, without dra-
ma, as a rule and not an exception. The
serious corruption doesn't count because
it's too prevalent; it is the rule, not the
unusual. The media reports on anti-reali-
ty-the exceptions, the unexpected little
hypocrisies and twists. A million chil-
dren can starve, but unless one starves
locally-in an unusual, photogenic, and
heart-rending, Cinderella-story way,
with either pathos or happy ending and
uplifting shared moment, forget it. But
we digress, feeling the better for it.
Well, what do we do now? We have
to reform the initiative system. We have
to establish public financing of cam-
paigns-I'm sorry, my friend, I hate the
thought of funding those campaigns too,
but it's us or the special interests. And
those people are spending $79 billion of
our money.. .for one-tenth of one percent,
I vote that we buy them. We can't afford
not to. And we have to have that wall of
integrity. An absolute wall that is a
bright line for all of us.
We want to admire these officials. We
entrust them with so much. Why don't
they understand that we want them
above reproach? Mother Teresa? We
should be so lucky. No, we don't ask for
that. But we do ask that she be accepted
as a rather worthy model to admire. To
answer the legislators who laughed at
the notion that they should be expected
to be Mother Teresas: the sadness here is
not that you have failed to emulate such
an example, but hat you reject it as a
standard for personal aspiration, that you
laugh at it. The most tragic consequence
of your cynicism and acceptance of the
incremental compromises leading you to
where you are today is that you still do
not understand how it happened, what it
means, or how to extricate yourself. You
have both led us down, and let us down.
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